The well reported outage of Toyota’s facilities in Japan, led to a shut down of 14 domestic assembly plants in August 2023, lasting 2-3 days.(

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The well reported outage of Toyota’s facilities in Japan, led to a shut down of 14 domestic assembly plants in August 2023, lasting 2-3 days.(https://lnkd.in/eGCTaP8A)

Toyota reported the failure was due to a systems issue, relating to the availability of its parts ordering systems. That followed system maintenance the day before the outage and resulted in a database error effecting both the production and backup environments.

Historically these are issues (Toyota’s 2022 due to a cyber attack on a supplier), that could be managed by the company and remain unreportable to market stakeholders. As of December 2023 the SEC requires covered registrants to report material cybersecurity Incidents, the definition of which is ’unauthorized occurrence, or a series of related unauthorized occurrences, on or conducted through a registrant’s information systems that jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a registrant’s information systems or any information residing therein.’

If the outage above occurred in January 2024, Toyotas board would be required to determine if the outage was ‘material’ in the view of a ‘reasonable investor’ and then if applicable, report it to the SEC as a material cyber incident within 4 days of a determination. (https://lnkd.in/ePpd9xDR)

The SEC ruling has broader implications that just those related to a cyber attack.

Ted Dziekanowski Rachel V. Rose, JD, MBA Bob Dix Brian D. McCarthy

#cybersecurity #cyberriskmanagement #cyberincident

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Cybersecurity, Governance & ESG, Regulation & Compliance

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