The rules of engagement required to deal with cyber are not the same as those of traditional physical security domains.

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The rules of engagement required to deal with cyber are not the same as those of traditional physical security domains. A point I made in my report to the All Party Parliamentary Committee on Artificial Intelligence (APPG-AI) this week.

‘But those rules dont hold in cyberspace, where much of the nefarious activity ¢â‚¬â€ whether by nation-states, cybercriminal ransomware gangs, or other threat actors ¢â‚¬â€ plays out non-stop in an ambiguous strategic grey zone.’ – Gen. Paul Nakasone

Current sanctions and deterrence are not working to prevent cyber attacks (BBC Report 17.11.21) and offensive cyber is increasing within the military and security domains. Cyber is a domain of more or less free operation for hackers. Nation state hackers are not successfully targeting the military (we know of), their success comes from the ‘soft underbelly’ that are the commercial organisations that provide CNI, products and services we increasing depend on as our dependency on cyberspace increases.

The question I raise is how do nation states affect defensive cyber security change to protect CNI and help secure cyberspace?

Ted Dziekanowski Jason Spezzano Brian McCarthy

#ransomware‚ #fisma‚ #ofac‚ #theaugustagroup‚ #theaugustaplan‚ #cybersecurity‚ #supplychainriskmanagement‚ #cyberriskmanagement‚ #compliance‚ #regulatorycompliance‚ #regulatoryoversight‚ #esg‚ #scrm‚ #cscrm‚ #fca‚ #cybercompliance‚ #cyberregulation‚ #cybergovernance‚ #falseclaimsact‚ #afcea‚ #afceacyber‚ #aws‚ #dhs‚ #cisa‚ #appgai‚ #securitiesandexchangecommission

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